Australian Army's Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters acquired from Airbus Defense and Space has been slammed by the national aud...
Australian Army's Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters acquired from Airbus Defense and Space has been slammed by the national auditor for having shortfalls against its initial requirements stipulated.
Report by Australian National Audit Office (AANO) says the fleet along with capability shortfalls, continue to experience higher sustainment cost and lower aircraft availability than expected.
The deal for 22 helicopters acquired for $1.1 billion along with a $397 million Through-Life Support contract was signed in 2001 on the basis that it was a low-risk off-the-shelf platform. The helicopter was intended to undertake escort missions and ground support to troops, attack, reconnaissance and recovery missions.
As at April 2016, the Tiger also had 76 capability deficiencies relating to Army’s current and future operational requirements, 60 of which were deemed by Defense to be critical. Other key limitations relate to shipborne operations, pilot flying hours, interoperability and communications, airworthiness, and the roof-mounted sight.
The Chief of Army declared Final Operational Capability for the Tiger on 14 April 2016, allowing the helicopter to be operationally employed, which was seven years later than planned.
To date, sustainment costs have exceeded the original contract value. The 15 year (2004–2019) sustainment contract provided for expenditure of $571 million. That sum was expended by June 2014, and expenditure as at June 2016 was $921 million.
As at June 2016, the cost per flying hour for the Tiger fleet was $30 335, compared to a target of $20 000. The long-term average was $39 472 per hour. Defence negotiated a cost cap to control sustainment cost growth in 2014.
The ANAO conducted a performance audit of the Tiger acquisition in 2005–06, and concluded that Tiger was more developmental than off-the-shelf and this heightened exposure to schedule, cost and capability risks, both for the acquisition of the aircraft and its sustainment.
The tiger is not capable of shipborne operations and the capability will be available only from mid-2017.
Tiger is equipped with the Eurogrid mapping and mission planning system and a proprietary data link that allows data communication directly between Tiger aircraft and Ground-Based Mission Equipment. At present, the Eurogrid system cannot communicate with Army’s Battle Management System or other Army Aviation platforms, due to architecture incompatibility. In addition, Army is unable to communicate key mission data to and from the Tiger platform in real time. These communications issues reduce the effectiveness of the aircraft as a reconnaissance platform.
Since June 2014, there have been two separate incidents across the world fleet of Tigers that have involved the stub wing mounted 70 mm rocket launcher detaching, uncommanded, in mid-flight. One incident involved a German variant UH Tiger, the other involved an Australian Tiger at Oakey in June 2014. The root cause remains ‘undetermined’.
The original requirement for Tiger’s air-to-ground missile was to provide a guided weapon accurate out to eight kilometres and outside the range of most Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. While the Tiger’s air-to-ground missile is accurate to these distances, the Tiger’s roof-mounted sight has an effective range of only around four kilometres. The Tiger may be within the effective range of enemy fire before the Tiger crew can positively identify and respond to the threat.
Read the full report here.
